We study corporate income taxation when firms operating in multiple jurisdictions can shift income using tax planning strategies. Because income of corporate groups is not consolidated for tax purposes in Canada, firms may use financial techniques, such as lending among affiliates, to reduce subnational corporate taxes. A simple theoretical model shows how income shifting affects real investment, government revenues, and tax base elasticities, depending on whether firms must allocate income to provinces or not. We then analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behaviour of corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting to comparable firms that must use the statutory allocation formula to determine their taxable income in each province. The evidence suggests that income shifting has pronounced effects on provincial tax bases. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for "income shifting" firms is 4.9, compared to 2.3 for other, comparable firms.
Introduction
In 2000, following the lead of the federal government, two Canadian provinces -Alberta and Ontario -announced sharp reductions to take place in general corporate income tax rates, from 15.5 per cent to 8 per cent by the year 2005. Since then, a number of other provinces have begun to cut tax rates as well, albeit not as dramatically.
Such sharp changes have occurred in the past. The province of Quebec lowered its corporate income tax rate on active business income from 16 per cent to 5 per cent in 1982, but has slowly raised the rate to about 9 per cent over the past two decades. Until recently, however, most other provinces had held their corporate income tax rates roughly constant since 1986, when corporate income tax reform was introduced at the federal level with a strategy of rate reduction and fewer tax incentives.
What factors can explain the decisions of governments about statutory corporate income tax rates? In recent years, increased attention has been given to the role of income shifting by multijurisdictional firms. Reported income of corporations can be highly responsive to statutory tax rates, when income can be easily shifted from one tax jurisdiction to another without moving real assets. 1 Some authors have suggested that income shifting may spur tax competition among governments and exert downward pressure on statutory rates (see, e.g. Gordon and MacKie-Mason, 1995) and on corporate tax credits (Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000) . While income shifting may increase elasticities of taxable income, however, it may also make real investment decisions less responsive to tax rates, if it allows firms to avoid some portion of their tax liabilities in the host country for investment. Thus, if governments value real investment of multijurisdictional firms, as well as the tax revenues they generate, income shifting may have ambiguous effects on welfare.
In order to evaluate the effects of income shifting, it is therefore important to understand its potentially offsetting effects on the elasticities with respect to local tax rates of taxable income and of real corporate assets. In our empirical work, we investigate income shifting by multijurisdictional firms to reduce subnational tax liabilities in Canada. In doing so, we exploit a particular feature of corporate income taxation in Canada: groups of corporate affiliates are not permitted to consolidate income for tax purposes (as they are required to do in many US states). In contrast, multijurisdictional firms that do not incorporate separate affiliates in each province must allocate total income according to a statutory formula based on the distribution of sales 2 and payroll among provinces. Allocation rules make it more difficult for a company to use certain techniques, particularly financing, to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions than it is under the separate accounting method. 3 Therefore, the sensitivity of taxable income to subnational rate changes should be lower for companies that allocate income, compared to comparable firms that do not. Our results, based on administrative tax data, are consistent with this hypothesis. According to our preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates for "income shifting" firms is 4.9, compared to 2.3 for other, comparable firms.
Our results contribute to a growing empirical literature on the effects of income shifting. 4 Hines (1994) suggests that income shifting can be quite dramatic: a tax haven's tax rate increase of 1 per cent would lower reported earnings by 7 per cent. Bartelsman and Beetsma (2000) report that a 1 percentage point change in a country's tax rate leads to a decline in reported before-tax income of 2.7 per cent. Fewer studies have examined income shifting at the subnational level. This may reflect in part the prevalence of the allocation (or apportionment) method to determine taxable income of corporate groups in the US, in place of the separate accounting method that is used in Canada. Klassen and Shackelford (2001) estimate subnational taxable income elasticities for firms in both Canada and the US. They focus on incentives to manipulate weights in allocation formulas, rather than financial income shifting. Nevertheless, our empirical approach is similar to theirs, while using more detailed data.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 lays out a theoretical model of income shifting 1 For recent surveys on corporate tax competition, see Wilson (1999) , Mintz (2000) , and Gresik (2001) . 2 The sales factor is determined on a destination basis in accordance with the retail sales tax system. 3 Many studies tend to focus on transfer pricing techniques for shifting income at the international level. However, the simplest way to shift income is through financial transactions, including "double dipping" deductions for interest expenses (see Mintz, 2000) . At the subnational level, the gains to such strategies are reduced, since tax rate differentials are typically less than they are internationally, but the non-tax costs of shifting are probably commensurately lower. 4 For example, see Harris et al. (1993) and Grubert and Slemrod (1998) on US corporations, and see Jog and Tang (2001) for a study of international income shifting by Canadian corporations. through a strategy of lending and borrowing among corporate affiliates. Using the model, we analyze the implications of income shifting for firms' real investment decisions and for government revenues. We then contrast the effects of the separate accounting and allocation methods of determining taxable income. The remainder of the paper provides evidence on the extent of income shifting by corporations among Canadian provinces. Section 3 provides background on the Canadian corporate income tax system. Section 4 estimates elasticities of taxable income for the provinces and examines how tax rate elasticities differ for firms that can engage in interjurisdictional income shifting and those that cannot. We also provide supplementary evidence on how firms may be engaging in income shifting. Section 5 concludes the paper.
A model
Consider a representative firm with an opportunity to invest in n jurisdictions. If k i is invested in productive capital in jurisdiction i, cash flow net of non-capital costs accruing to the firm there is f i (k i ), where f i is a strictly concave for k i > 0, and f i (0) = 0. Each jurisdiction levies a sourcebased tax on corporate income, while exempting foreign-source income of domestic residents. The firm can obtain units of capital at a rental cost r, a cost which is not deductible from tax liabilities in any jurisdiction. 5 The rate of return to capital is fixed, independent of local tax systems: taken together, the jurisdictions we study together constitute a small, open economy with respect to the world capital market.
Taxation and financial strategies. Each jurisdiction operates a separate accounting system for determining corporate taxable income, in which the firm's local affiliate is taxed on the basis of net income as reported on its books. Consequently, the firm can affect its worldwide tax bill through a strategy of borrowing and lending among affiliates incorporated in each jurisdiction. 6 Let B i be the interest payments owed on the amount borrowed in i and t i be the statutory tax rate there: the firm's tax payments in i are then
Since the firm is constrained not to issue outside debt, interest payments deducted from income in one jurisdiction must be declared and taxed in another; thus ∑ B i = 0. Each affiliate's borrowing also entails real deadweight costs C i (B i , k i ). We assume these cost functions are linear homogeneous in their arguments, so that
is the interest-to-capital ratio in i. We assume that c i (b) is non-negative, increasing, and strictly convex for b > 0, whereas c i (b) = 0 for all b ≤ 0. That is, there are deadweight costs associated with borrowing, but not with lending from an affiliate. Taking real investment decisions k = (k 1 , . . . , k n ) as fixed for now, the firm's optimal financial structure therefore solves
5 Thus the firm finances investment with equity alone and all jurisdictions operate classical corporate income tax systems. Alternatively, with minimal changes to the model, r can be interpreted as the after-tax cost of capital, given the firm's aggregate debt-equity ratio.
6 Of course, strategies other than intra-firm borrowing have similar effect. For example, our analysis can be applied without substantial change to analyze manipulation of transfer prices. However, as Søren Bo Neilsen pointed out to us, corporations can generally shift only normal profits on capital with financing techniques, while transfer pricing (including misreporting of interest rates) may be used to shift rents as well.
Suppose there is a single jurisdiction, say jurisdiction 1, that levies the lowest tax rate: t 1 = min{t 1 , . . . , t n }. Thus jurisdiction 1 is the "tax haven" among the n jurisdictions. Manipulating the first-order conditions for (2), an optimal financial policy satisfies
Thus the firm borrows in each high-tax jurisdiction and declares all interest income in the tax haven, with the level of borrowing determined so that the marginal deadweight cost of borrowing in each jurisdiction equals the net tax advantage t i − t 1 to doing so.
Inverting the first-order conditions, we may write
as the optimal interest-to-capital ratio in i > 1 and
as the net gain to the optimal strategy in i > 1, per unit of capital invested there. Note that, since c i is strictly convex, ψ i (z) > 0 for z > 0. For notational convenience, we also define ψ 1 (z) ≡ 0. The firm's profits can then be written
Optimal investment. Eq. (5) shows that the potential to shift income to the tax haven increases the firm's after-tax profits. But income shifting also affects the real investment decisions of the firm, since the deadweight costs of affiliates' borrowing depends on real investment as well. The firm's optimal investment in i can be obtained by differentiating (5) to obtain the first-order con-
where
is the marginal effective tax rate on investment in i.
The effect of income shifting on investment can immediately be determined by comparing the optimal investment rule to that which would obtain if income shifting were prohibited. In that case, the ψ i terms are absent in the profit function (5), and the optimal investment rule is the standard one: f i (k 0 i ) = r + τ 0 i , where the effective tax rate on investment becomes
Since ψ i > 0 for i > 1, we immediately have the following result.
Proposition 1 Investment in all high-tax jurisdictions is greater than if income shifting were prohibited, and statutory tax rates were held constant.
In contrast, equilibrium investment in the tax haven is unaffected by income shifting, a consequence of our assumption that intra-corporate lending entails no deadweight cost there. More generally, some forms of income shifting (particularly transfer pricing) might be facilitated by increased real investment in the tax haven (see Altshuler and Grubert, 2000) . In such cases, our result would change: income shifting would cause investment to increase in all jurisdictions.
Tax revenues. One implication of the foregoing is that the corporate tax has the same effects on investment as a property tax 7 at rate τ i < τ 0 i as defined in (7). Put differently, the income shifting regime facilitates real investment in high-tax jurisdictions, even in the presence of high statutory tax rates. This is a desirable effect of income shifting for governments that value investment by the firm (because of its effects on local employment or wages, for example), as well as the tax revenues the firm generates.
Of course, an income shifting regime at statutory tax rate t i will not generally result in the same level of government tax revenues as would a property tax at the equivalent rate τ i . Unlike a property tax, the corporate income tax may tax inframarginal rents earned by the firm in the jurisdiction, and it results in shifting of revenues to the low-tax jurisdiction, as well as deadweight costs for firms. In general, the effect of these differences would be ambiguous: depending on the size of inframarginal rents and deadweight costs, revenues may be higher or lower under the corporate tax than under the investment-equivalent property tax. The comparison of the two systems is more straightforward when entry by other multi jurisdictional firms drives excess profit to zero. Formally, suppose there exists a continuum of firms with access to the same production technology in all jurisdictions. In equilibrium, prices of factors and outputs at each location will adjust such that each firm's worldwide after-tax profits are zero: π(k) = 0 at the optimal vector k. Further, to facilitate the comparison between the income and property tax regimes, we suppose that changes in government revenue have no direct impact on the firm's cash flows f i (k i ).
First we note that, if the firm earns zero profits on a worldwide basis, then it must earn zero profits in each jurisdiction separately. Since f i (0) = 0, the firm must earn non-negative profit at each location:
at the optimum. We can write revenues in i > 1, using (1), (3), (4) and (9), as
Here D i is the deadweight loss of the tax system per unit of capital invested in i, from the perspective of the government in i. That is, they regard revenues transferred to the tax haven as pure waste, as well as the amount lost through true deadweight costs of the shifting strategy. Eq. (10) implies that a statutory corporate tax rate t i is equivalent in the presence of income shifting to a property tax on capital at rate τ i , together with a "tax" on (or leakage from) the local tax base at rate D i . Since D i > 0, we have the following.
Proposition 2 Government revenues in any high-tax jurisdiction would rise, and real investment would be unchanged, if the corporate income tax regime were replaced by a property tax system at the equivalent tax rate defined in (7).
Thus, while income shifting facilitates investment by lowering effective tax rates, it results in a larger than proportional decline in tax revenues. In this model, all governments in high-tax jurisdictions would prefer to ban income shifting if possible, or to adopt an equivalent property tax system, regardless of the relative valuations they assign to investment and revenues generated by multijurisdictional firms.
Comparison to unitary taxation. If income shifting cannot be prohibited per se, it could be made irrelevant if governments were to adopt a system of unitary taxation, in which the income of multijurisdictional corporate groups is consolidated and then allocated to governments on the basis of some formula. But Gordon and Wilson (1986) have shown that allocation rules also change investment by firms and revenues received by governments in complicated ways. Here we sketch their model of allocation rules and contrast its effects with those of a separate accounting system in the presence of income shifting.
For simplicity, we consider a system in which the total taxable income of the firm,
, is allocated on the basis of property weights alone. Let K = ∑ k i denote total capital property. Under a system of unitary taxation with allocation on the basis of property, tax revenues in i are
where the superscript denotes "allocation". Total tax payments are R a = ∑ i R a i , and the average tax rate on net revenues is denotedt
Substituting (13) into (12) and summing gives R a =t 1 −t rK so that the marginal effective tax rate on investment in i is
Furthermore, tax revenues in i can be expressed from (12)- (14) as
Comparing (14) and (15) to their counterparts for the separate accounting regime, (7) and (10), shows that a switch to unitary taxation causes complicated changes in investment incentives and tax revenues. We defer a full comparison of the two systems for future research. In our empirical work reported below, however, we are especially interested in comparing the responsiveness of tax bases to tax rate increases under systems of separate accounting and unitary taxation. Accordingly, let Y i = f i (k i ) − B i denote the tax base in i under separate accounting, and let Y a i = k i F/K denote the tax base on unitary taxation. Differentiating the two expressions beginning from a point of equal tax rates t i = t for all i yields:
evaluated at the effective tax rate τ 0 i = rt/(1 − t). Thus:
Proposition 3 When inter-jurisdiction tax differences are sufficiently small, the elasticity of taxable income is greater under separate accounting than under formula allocation.
Beginning from a point of uniform taxation in all jurisdictions, there is no income shifting under the separate accounting rule, and no distortions in relative investment levels under the unitary taxation regime. Thus a unilateral tax increase by one jurisdiction affects investment in the same way under both regimes. But the tax increase creates an additional incentive for borrowing by the local affiliate under separate accounting, so that the tax base is more responsive to tax changes than under unitary taxation.
Subnational corporate taxation in Canada
Canada provides a useful case study of income shifting through financial transactions and its implications for how provinces may engage in corporate income tax rate competition. Canada does not consolidate income earned by corporate groups for tax purposes, so that multijurisdictional companies with separate subsidiaries in each province have opportunities to shift income from high-tax (such as British Columbia) to low-tax jurisdictions (such as Quebec). On the other hand, there are many multijurisdictional companies with branches and sales offices in different provinces which must allocate income across provinces according to an allocation formula agreed upon by the provinces. 8 Thus, there are three types of companies relevant to our study: (i) firms that operate in a single jurisdiction, (ii) firms that operate in multiple jurisdictions through separate subsidiaries and so do not allocate income, and (iii) firms that operate in multiple jurisdictions through a single corporate entity, so that income of the corporation is allocated across provinces according to the formula.
In Canada, provinces may set their own corporate income tax rates. Three provinces (Alberta, Ontario and Quebec) collect their own corporate income taxes; these together account for about 75 per cent of provincial corporate income (Technical Committee on Business Taxation, 1998, Chapter 10). The rest of the provinces allow the federal government to collect the corporate income tax on their behalf, while retaining the right to set their own statutory corporate income tax rates. Generally, the provinces have a general rate of tax on large corporations that vary from as low as 9.12 per cent in Quebec to as high as 17 per cent in New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Manitoba and Saskatchewan (as of 1999). Quebec imposes a higher tax rate on investment income of corporations. Most provinces (except Quebec in recent years) provide a lower corporate income tax for small Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPCs). 9 A few provinces have lower tax rates on manufacturing and processing income, as does the federal government.
8 This is unlike the United States, where individual states have been free to choose the weights for allocating income. Although there are some small differences among jurisdictions in Canada, the weights are generally the same. See Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation (1998), Chapter 10. 9 The low tax rate applies to the first $200,000 (a lower threshold applied in the mid-1980s). Since 1992, the low rate is clawed back for companies with more than $10 million in taxable capital (essentially book assets). All income is taxed at the full rate when taxable capital exceeds $15 million. Table 1 reports combined federal and provincial statutory rates 10 for large corporations and small CCPCs for 1986, 1999, and for an average of the 1986-99 period. Since the federal government and many Canadian provinces levy lower statutory tax rates on manufacturing firms, the figures in the table are also averaged across industries, using fixed industry value added shares in each province as weights. As the table indicates, statutory rates on large corporations have declined over the past fifteen years, mostly as a result of reductions in federal rates (recorded separately in the bottom row). Rates levied on small businesses have remained stable. Moreover, statutory rates for large corporations declaring income in Quebec are substantially lower than in other provinces, although the difference in rates has declined somewhat in recent years.
Canada integrates corporate and personal taxes by providing a dividend tax credit and excluding a portion of capital gains from taxation. At the small business level, the combined corporate and personal tax rate on equity income is roughly equal to the personal rate on employment and interest income, while for large companies combined tax rates on equity income exceed that of other income. When the small corporate tax rate has been changed in the past, governments have typically adjusted dividend and capital gains tax rates to maintain integration at the smallbusiness level, in order to minimize incentives for shifting between corporate and personal tax bases.
Provinces that have concluded tax collection agreements with the federal government adhere to the same tax base as for the federal corporate income tax (except for provincial tax credits). While the three provinces that collect their own corporate income taxes may set any tax base, they generally have followed the federal rules for determining taxable income. Corporate income tax harmonization has led provinces to agree in general to a common method of allocating income across the provinces. The general formula for allocating income is the sum of shares of payroll and sales in a province, divided by two. Some other formulas are used for special cases such as transportation and financial industries-these replace the sales factor with other indicators, such as passenger miles and assets.
There are several policies that affect the willingness of provinces to engage in corporate income tax competition:
• The federal government provides equalization payments to all provinces except Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. The effect of the formula, especially for the small provinces, is that a rate reduction that leads to a greater corporate income tax base can reduce the amount of equalization paid to the province. Therefore, the equalization program can reduce the incentive for smaller equalization-recipient provinces to engage in tax competition (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2002 ).
• Provincial corporate income taxes are not deductible from federal corporate income tax, so that there is less incentive for provinces to raise corporate income tax rates than if the burden of tax increases were shared with the federal government.
• Given the lack of corporate consolidation, there can be significant incentives for companies that do not allocate corporate income to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax provinces. The well-known Quebec financing lease structure results in companies shifting income from high-tax provinces to Quebec where there is a substantially lower rate of tax. There are however some tax rules to limit the ability of companies to shift income across jurisdictions, even within a corporate group of subsidiaries separately located across provinces. For example, companies cannot deduct interest expense if debt is more than the property of the corporation.
Income shifting and tax base elasticities
A key implication of our model, given in Proposition 3, is that mobility of corporate taxable income among jurisdictions is greater under a separate accounting system that tolerates income shifting than under a system of unitary taxation. When this is so, tax setting by governments is apt to be governed principally by competition for financial flows rather than for productive investment.
To investigate this hypothesis, we examined administrative tax data for Canadian provinces and estimated elasticities of taxable income for corporations that have significant interjurisdictional income shifting opportunities and for those that do not.
Data and estimation procedure
The principal source of our data is the Corpac data set, which is maintained by the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency and which records a subset of information from T2 tax records for the universe of Canadian corporations. We use Corpac's recorded taxable corporate income as the main dependent variable in our analysis. The data sources are described in more detail in an appendix to the paper. Corpac includes records for an average of nearly 900,000 firms in each year in the 1986-99 period. In order to preserve confidentiality, the Department of Finance aggregated the data; that is, firm-level records were summed for each province and year in which the corporations operated and the broad industry groups that were their principal lines of business. Data for the small provinces were combined, yielding six province identifiers in our constructed data set: Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, Prairie provinces, Alberta, and British Columbia. 11 Similarly, there 11 The Atlantic provinces are Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. The Prairie are seven industry groups in our data set: Primary, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Communications and Utilities, Wholesale and Retail Trade, and Services. Financial corporations were excluded from the population, because non-tax regulations in that sector appear to have substantial effects on organizational form and location decisions.
The source data set also contains information on whether the corporation allocated income to several provinces for tax purposes or paid tax in only a single province, and on whether the corporation is a subsidiary of another corporation. (It is not possible, however, to link records of members of a corporate group.) Since these characteristics influence the ability of the firm to engage in income shifting, the data were aggregated by the Department of Finance into distinct groups of firms that paid tax in a single or in multiple jurisdictions, and groups of firms that are subsidiaries and those that are not. 12 The data were also aggregated separately for "small" firms that paid tax in a single or in multiple jurisdictions. 13 In summary, the aggregation procedure yielded six categories of firms (four large firm categories and two small firm categories) for each of the 588 province-industry-year cells, and a total of 3509 observations. (Nineteen cells were not available to us, because of confidentiality restrictions.)
Using the constructed data, we estimated taxable income elasticities for the standard log-linear specification:
log y ipsc = x ipsc β + η c log(
where y ipsc is real taxable income per capita of firms in province p, industry i, year s, and firm category c; t ipsc is the corresponding combined federal and provincial statutory tax rate, and x ipsc is a vector of other explanatory variables. To learn more about income shifting, we also estimate analogous equations for other dependent variables; details are given below. Our specification allows tax rate elasticities η c to differ based on observable characteristics of firms that are related to their ability to shift income among jurisdictions using tax planning strategies. In our preferred specification, we estimate separate elasticities for three categories of firms: (i) large corporations that pay tax in a single province (i.e. that do not allocate income using the statutory formula) and are subsidiaries of other corporations; (ii) other large corporations; and (iii) small corporations. (We experiment with other classifications below.) To the extent that this classification is a good proxy firms' opportunities to engage in income shifting, we expect the estimated elasticity for the first category of firms to reflect income shifting as well as mobility of real investment, whereas elasticities for the latter two categories should mainly reflect mobility of real investment. For convenience, we refer to the three categories as "shifters", "non-shifters", and "small" firms. Table 2 reports the average annual real per capita taxable income of large corporations, and it provides an illustration of some aspects of our method. In the table, taxable incomes are presented for the above two categories of large corporations for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors of the economy in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec. These are the most populous Canadian provinces and have broadly similar industrial composition. Moreover, Quebec levies the lowest corporate tax rates in Canada, whereas Ontario is a high-tax province. The relevant tax rates are reported in column 3 of the table: observe that the difference in rates is greater for provinces are Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Together, these six small provinces comprised less than 15 per cent of the Canadian population during the 1990s and eight per cent of corporate profits.
12 Because of confidentiality restrictions, it was not possible to distinguish between subsidiaries whose parents are foreign and domestic taxpayers. Thus our estimates below may capture the effects of international as well as interprovincial income shifting.
13 "Small" firms are corporations eligible for the federal small business deduction, i.e. Canadian-controlled private corporations with income less than $200,000 and assets less than $15 million. non-manufacturing firms, since Ontario (like some other provinces) levies a preferential rate for manufacturing and processing firms only, while the low rate is more widely available in Quebec. Column 2 records annual real taxable income per capita of "non-shifting" corporations, averaged over the 1986-99 period, which is about 40 per cent higher in Ontario in both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. (Per capita GDP at factor cost was 21 per cent higher in Ontario over the same period.) Column 1 reports the corresponding figures for "shifting" firms. Consistent with our hypothesis, the difference in taxable income between the two provinces is much greater in manufacturing (at 60.6 per cent), where the tax difference is small, than in non-manufacturing (at 9.0 per cent), where the tax difference is larger. On the basis of these figures, one may estimate the elasticity of taxable income to be -6.5 for shifting firms (the 52 per cent income difference between the two sectors divided by the -8 per cent tax difference), but essentially zero for non-shifting firms. Our approach in the regression analysis below is similar, while adding more controls for observed and unobserved differences among cells. Naturally, drawing policy inferences from our approach is a precarious exercise, and our estimates cannot be regarded as estimates of structural parameters. Importantly, however, it is likely for a number of reasons that our approach underestimates true differences in elasticities of shifting and non-shifting firms. First, our classification places firms that are subsidiaries but which do some business in multiple provinces in the second, non-shifting category, and subsidiaries that are related only to firms incorporated in the same province (for which income shifting opportunities are therefore limited) in the first, shifting category. Both of these misclassifications should lead to attenuation bias in elasticity estimates. Second, our approach regards corporate organization decisions as exogenous, unrelated to tax rate differences among provinces. In reality, firms may choose the structure and location of their affiliates in response to current and expected future tax rates, and this potential for self-selection into our "shifting" and "non-shifting" categories might lead to upward or downward bias our estimates. We investigate this issue further in Section 4.2. Observe, however, that an increase in tax rate differentials is likely to induce more firms to incorporate separately in a number of jurisdictions in order to engage more easily in income shifting. For this reason as well, therefore, our approach tends to underestimate "structural" tax rate elasticities.
Estimates
Taxable income elasticities. Table 3 reports estimates of equation (17) for the classification of firms described above. In column (1), explanatory variables include, in addition to the statutory tax rate, the logarithms of real provincial per capita gross domestic product at factor cost ("income") and an index of US producer prices for the industry in which the firms operate ("export price"), together with fixed effects for firm type, year, and the complete set of province-industry interactions. Thus we employ a "difference-in-differences" estimator, in which identification of tax rate elasticities is derived from differences in tax rates among industries, provinces, and firm types. In particular, the estimates are not affected by persistent differences in industrial composition among the provinces that may be correlated with tax rates. Results in this column are consistent with the model. The estimated elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate 14 for "shifting" firms is 4.9. Put differently, a one percentage point reduction in the tax rate from 0.43 (the mean for large firms in the sample) to 0.42 induces a 8.5 per cent increase in taxable income. As expected, estimated elasticities for the two categories of "non-shifting" firms are much smaller: 2.3 for other large corporations and an insignificant 1.2 for small firms. It is perhaps not surprising that income of small firms is insensitive to tax rates, since for non-tax reasons most of these firms are likely to be immobile across provincial boundaries. More important is the finding that elasticities are substantially lower for large non-shifting corporations, which are otherwise comparable to the shifting firms.
The remaining two columns of the table present results for different specifications of the other explanatory variables. Column (2) reports results for a specification that excludes the provinceindustry interaction fixed effects but includes fixed effects for province-firm type interactions, in addition to industry, year, and firm type fixed effects. This specification allows us to investigate the possibility that our results merely reflect differences in corporate organization among provinces-for example, that firms in low-tax provinces are less likely to operate in multiple jurisdictions or more likely to be members of corporate groups for reasons that are unrelated to tax rates. Estimated elasticities for large corporations are smaller in this case (4.0 for shifting firms and 1.5 for non-shifting firms), but the difference between elasticities of shifting and non-shifting firms remains significant. The estimated elasticity for small corporations is significantly negative in this case, which leads us to reject the specification in any case. Column (3) reports results for a specification identical to that of column (1), except that provincial per capita income is excluded as a potentially endogenous regressor. Estimated elasticities are essentially the same. Table 4 reports estimates for alternative classifications of firms into the shifting and nonshifting categories. To aid in comparisons, column (1) of the table repeats the estimates for our base specification, i.e. from column (1) of Table 3 . In all columns, other regressors are income, export price, and industry-province, year, and firm type fixed effects. In column (2), "shifters" are defined as all large corporations that are subsidiaries of other corporations. Thus firms that are subsidiaries but that allocate income among several provinces by formula are reclassified from the second category to the first. The predicted impact of this on estimated elasticities is ambiguous, since the reclassified firms may include both shifting firms with high elasticities and non-shifting firms with low elasticities. In fact, the estimated tax rate elasticity for shifting firms is 3.3 in this case, compared to 4.9 in the base specification. The estimate for non-shifting firms remains un- changed at 2.3, but the difference between the two elasticities becomes insignificant in column (2) (p-value of 0.15). Column (3) reports results for a third classification of firms; in this case, firms that allocate taxable income are excluded entirely from the sample. In this case, therefore, the sample is restricted to large, single-jurisdiction firms, together with small firms, and "shifters" are subsidiaries, while "non-shifters" are not (and so may be unaffiliated or parents of other corporations). The estimated elasticity of non-shifters is larger in this case at 2.8, which is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, the difference between estimates for shifting and non-shifting firms remains significant (p-value of 0.03).
Strategies for income shifting. The preceding results are consistent with the notion that multijurisdictional firms operating through subsidiaries are able to use income shifting to avoid substantial amounts of provincial corporate taxes in Canada. But the results give no indication of how it is actually done. To learn more, we examined data aggregated from the Department of Finance's Corporate Sample File, which records supplementary information about taxpayers. The Corporate Sample File is a stratified random sample of 16,000 firms in the Corpac universe of taxfilers which includes certain items from firms' income statements in addition to the information from tax forms. (See the appendix for more details.) Since the sample is large, and since all large firms are included in the sample each year, results should be comparable to those obtained with the Corpac universe file. To verify this, we first replicated our baseline taxable income elasticity specification using the sample data. Results are reported in column (1) of Table 5 . Estimates (1) "shifters" are subsidiaries that do not allocate.
(2) "shifters" are all subsidiaries. (3) "shifters" are all subsidiaries, and firms that allocate are excluded from the regression.
* : Significant at 5 per cent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
are quite similar to the corresponding estimates in column (1) of Table 3 : the estimate for shifting firms is 4.6 (rather than 4.9). The elasticity for large, allocating firms is 2.6; the difference between the two is significant at the 10 per cent level.
One potential objection to our inferences is that differences in taxable income of allocating and unijurisdictional firms might reflect exogenous differences in the pattern of sales, rather than tax planning strategies. For example, multijurisdictional firms with a large proportion of sales in low tax provinces might opt for allocation rather than separate incorporation in order to take advantage of tax averaging through the formula. If so, taxable income of allocating firms would appear less sensitive to tax rates than that of non-allocating firms, even in the absence of income shifting. That is, self-selection by firms between allocation and separate incorporation may bias our estimates of the extent to which taxable income responds to changes in tax rates. Note however that there are significant differences in estimated elasticities of subsidiaries and non-subsidiaries, even when allocating firms are excluded from the sample, as in column (3) of Table 4 . Furthermore, significant differences in elasticities remain in the specification reported in column (2) of Table 3 , where we estimate separate fixed effects for the three types of firm in each province. Thus the elasticity estimates do not merely reflect, for example, higher income of allocating firms in low-tax provinces.
To provide further evidence on this point, we re-estimated elasticities using taxable income as a fraction of sales (calculated on a destination basis for allocating firms) as the dependent variable. Under the hypothesis of income shifting, this fraction should be lower in high-tax provinces for Notes: In columns (1) and (2), the regression specification is the same as column (1) of Table 3 . In columns (3) and (4), the specification is the same as column (3) of Table 4 . * : Significant at 5 per cent level. Standard errors in parentheses.
unijurisdictional subsidiaries than it is for other firms. Results, which are reported in column (2) of Table 5 , are consistent with this view. The point estimate for "shifting" firms is 1.3, compared to an insignificant 0.5 for "non-shifting" firms. An alternative approach is to use sales alone as the dependent variable. In that approach, estimated tax effects (not reported in the table) are significantly negative for both categories of large firms, but not significantly different from each other. Thus there is no evidence that the relationship between sales and tax rates is different for allocating firms and unijurisdictional firms. However, we caution that the distinction between taxable income and sales does not correspond to the distinction between tax planning and real location decisions of firms: a tax planning firm is by definition one which seeks to overstate deductible expenses in high-tax jurisdictions, and to overstate revenues in low-tax jurisdictions. Thus the responsiveness of revenues to tax rates might reflect either tax planning or real decisions. Column (3) reports results of a regression in which the dependent variable is real total declared assets 15 per capita. Since it is not possible to assign the assets of multijurisdictional firms to the various provinces in which they operate, multijurisdictional firms were deleted from the sample, and the classification of firms corresponds to that in the last column of Table 4 : that is, "shifters" are corporate subsidiaries, and "non-shifters" are unaffiliated firms and corporate parents. The asset data should in principle give some indication of how subnational taxes affect real investment of firms, in contrast to their tax planning decisions. Once again, the estimated tax rate elasticity is largest at 1.7 for shifting firms, and is in this case insignificantly different from zero for other corporations, which is inconsistent with our hypothesis. As with taxable income, however, it is possible that declared assets respond to tax rate differentials when firms engage in income shifting. Such "asset shuffles" may reflect avoidance of corporation income taxes on operating through leasing strategies (see Section 3 above), avoidance of capital gains taxes, and avoidance of provincial capital taxes.
The last column in the table examines the impact of taxes on interest payments on bonds and mortgages as a percentage of revenues reported in the firms' annual income statements. As with the asset variable, we are forced to restrict attention in this case to unijurisdictional firms. While our formal model focuses on interest payments to corporate affiliates as a strategy for income shifting, the reality is surely more complicated, and many other financial strategies are available for income shifting among provinces. That being said, our results show that interest payments are significantly related to taxes for "shifting" firms, but not for other firms.
Conclusion
In recent years, the process of globalization has brought nations closer together and, apparently, brought their governments into greater competition for business tax bases. Two aspects of globalization have had important and conceptually distinct implications for business tax competition: reductions in transportation and communication costs may make real business investment more mobile across jurisdictional boundaries, and financial innovation and liberalization may facilitate international tax avoidance by less footloose firms.
Our analysis suggests that the distinction between these two forms of economic integration is important. When firms may costlessly shift income to low-tax jurisdictions through financial transactions, real investment choices of firms and the tax policy environment of governments are changed. Income shifting tends to make the location of real investment less responsive to tax rate differentials, even as taxable income becomes more elastic. While income shifting may reduce revenues of high-tax jurisdictions, therefore, it may have offsetting effects on real investment that are attractive to governments.
While these considerations are most relevant to international income shifting, our analysis is conducted in a subnational rather than international context. Income shifting is likely easier for firms (though often less lucrative) when avoidance transactions do not cross international boundaries. That being said, subnational corporate income taxation in Canada provides a useful case study of the effects of income shifting. All provinces operate significant corporate income tax systems, but one province, Quebec, imposes statutory tax rates substantially below those of other provinces. Further, since corporate groups are not required to consolidate income for tax purposes, a number of tax planning devices are essentially unrestricted for firms that incorporate separately in different provinces. Consistent with the model, we find that taxable income of corporate subsidiaries that do not allocate income is significantly more elastic with respect to tax rates than income of other, comparable firms that do allocate income by formula and those that are not corporate subsidiaries. These results are suggestive of the role of income shifting in the investment decisions of large, multijurisdictional firms, and of its implications for tax policy choices of affected governments.
The evidence from the Canadian data is striking, but it leaves a number of unanswered questions for future research. Our results provide no direct evidence on which firms choose organizational forms that are conducive to income shifting and which do not. Since our estimates indicate that the potential for income shifting among affiliates is large, the decision of some firms to forgo these opportunities remains something of a puzzle. Furthermore, our reduced form estimates, which ignore the organizational decision, do not permit us to conduct policy-relevant simulations of the impact of changes in statutory tax rates or in the rules for consolidating income of corporate groups. Similarly, while our estimates are indicative of responses to tax rates that are predominantly financial rather than real, our approach does not permit us to recover separate estimates for each type of response. Addressing all these issues would require data on individual taxpayers that links members of corporate groups, and a model of the organizational and locational decisions of groups. (See Grubert and Slemrod, 1998 , for one approach to some of these issues.) As well, our approach takes provincial statutory tax rates as exogenous, rather than simultaneously determined, as theories of tax competition would suggest. The issue is unimportant for our data, since provincial tax rates remained roughly constant in most provinces over the sample period, and our regressions include provincial fixed effects. In other contexts, however, it would be worthwhile to consider how income shifting and competition for investment may have affected governments' decisions about statutory tax rates and tax subsidies to investment.
Appendix: Data sources
Our data are derived from a number of sources. The principal source of data for the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 is the Corpac data set, which is maintained by the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency and which records a subset of information from T2 tax records for the universe of Canadian corporations. We use Corpac's recorded taxable corporate income as the main dependent variable in our analysis.
Corpac is an administrative data base that includes records for an average of nearly 900,000 firms in each year in the 1986-99 period. In order to preserve confidentiality, the Department of Finance aggregated the data before providing them to us. That is, firm-level records were summed for each province and year in which the corporations operated and the broad industry groups that were their principal lines of business, as well as on the basis of various aspects of the taxpayers' legal organizational form. This aggregation procedure is described in detail above, in the main text of the paper. In summary, the aggregation procedure yielded six categories of firms (four large firm categories, depending on whether the firms allocated income or not, and whether the firms were subsidiaries of other corporations or not, and two small firm categories, depending on whether the firms allocated income or not) for each of the 588 province-industry-year cells, and a total of 3509 observations. (Nineteen cells were not available to us, because of confidentiality restrictions.) The taxable income data were then linked with information on provincial and federal statutory corporate income tax rates, which were taken from various issues of the National Finances and the Finances of the Nation, published by the Canadian Tax Foundation. Provincial gross domestic product at factor cost, the national GDP price deflator, and the provincial population data are from Statistics Canada. To proxy for the export prices facing industries in each province, we took US producer price data from Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) , and aggregated them to the same level of aggregation as the seven industries in our data set using the 1984 industry shares of value added in the broad industry aggregates for each province as the index weights. Thus the export price variable varies across both industries and provinces over time, whereas the income variable is common to all industries in a province.
Supplementary information on firms' total revenues, total declared assets, and interest paid on bonds and mortgages was taken from the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency's Corporate Sample File (CSF) for the 1986-98 period. The CSF is a stratified random sample of about 16,000 taxpayer records from the Corpac universal data set, with annual resampling. In addition to the random sample, the largest taxpayers in Corpac are included automatically in the CSF each year.
Taxable income totals in the two data sets are therefore very similar. Once again, because of confidentiality restrictions, the CSF data were aggregated for us by the Department of Finance. The aggregation procedure was the same as that described in the main text for the Corpac data set. In this case, however, it was not necessary to aggregate subsidiaries and non-subsidiaries among the small firms, so that there are eight firm categories rather than six. For each category, there are 546 province-industry-year cells, and a total of 4060 observations. (One hundred and ninety small firm cells and 37 large firm cells cells were empty or missing for confidentiality reasons.) To construct the revenue variable for multijurisdictional firms, we allocated national total revenues from the firms' income statements to the provinces in which they operated using the provincial revenue shares used by tax authorities for allocating corporate income.
